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FOREWORD
Military cyberspace operations have been ongoing
since before the advent of the Internet, and their influence on traditional military operations continues to
increase. What are the significant changes in mission
and structure of Department of Defense offensive and
defensive cyberspace activities over the past decade?
How do joint and Army cyberspace military operations fit into the complex and dynamic sphere of daily
network defense as well as international deterrence
and escalation?
To facilitate the operationalization of this new domain, education of the tenets of cyberspace must occur at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of
leadership. The persistent increase of cyberspace activities in global events continues to make international dynamics more complex. The scope of context for
such matters needs to consider not just other military
efforts or even other instruments of national power,
but how they are presented in an escalation framework and where they may be going.
This monograph posits that expanding deterrence
forces to include conventional strike and cyber offense
can add capability and credibility, as well as flexibility,
to course-of-action development available for national
command authorities. It also argues that cyberspace
operations, such as automated cyber defense, can support and enhance deterrence operations and limited
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conflict as well as help control escalation and
reduce risk.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Military cyberspace operations have been ongoing
since before the advent of the Internet. Such operations
have evolved significantly over the past 2 decades and
are now emerging into the realm of military operations in the traditional domains of land, sea, and air.
The goal of this monograph is to provide senior policymakers, decisionmakers, military leaders, and their
respective staffs with a better understanding of Army
cyberspace operations within the context of overall
U.S. military cyberspace operations. It first looks at the
evolution of Department of Defense (DoD) cyberspace
operations over the past decade. Next, it examines the
evolution of the Army implementation of cyberspace
operations. Finally, it explores the role of cyberspace
operations in the escalation of international conflict.
The scope of discussion is at the survey level of
detail to provide an overall appreciation for the complex and dynamic nature of evolving cyberspace operations. It is limited to unclassified and open source
information; any classified discussion must occur at
an appropriate venue. Although the details contained
herein are largely focused on military applications,
the reader must realize that whole-of-government efforts are essential for the successful implementation of
national security efforts in cyberspace.
This monograph has three main sections:
• Evolution of Military Cyberspace Operations.
This section examines the founding of U.S. Cyber Command from its roots in various military units focused on defensive and offensive
cyberspace operations. It reviews the initial operation of the command under the leadership
of General Keith Alexander as well as its cur-
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rent operations led by Admiral Michael Rogers. Also, it assesses the command’s mission
to direct operations, defend networks, and, on
order, conduct full spectrum operations, with
respect to its appropriateness and adeptness
for the command and control of military cyberspace forces.
• Evolution of Army Cyberspace Operations.
Having examined the evolution of joint cyberspace operations, this section focuses on parallel evolutionary efforts in Army cyberspace
operations toward the establishment of Army
Cyber Command. It examines initial operations
of the command under the leadership of Lieutenant General Rhett Hernandez as well as its
current operations led by Lieutenant General
Edward Cardon. This includes a brief review of
recent efforts to establish Fort Gordon, Georgia
as the center of gravity for Army cyberspace
activities.
• Cyberspace Operations in a Global Context.
This section examines the sufficiency of the
current cyberspace force structure to address
an international environment of multiple actors
interacting with varying degrees of tension. In
such a global situation, cyberspace operations
seeking to produce certain effects must also be
examined for their potential to cause escalation
of activities; possibly even up to the point of
existential threat. The section presents a modified Kahn escalation ladder as a useful metaphor to explore how cyberspace activities may
integrate with traditional military operations
across the spectrum of international conflict as
well as how such defenses influence national
responses related to deterrence and escalation.
x

This monograph examines the past and present
joint and Army cyberspace military operations, as
well as how these operations may fit into the complex
and dynamic sphere of international deterrence and
escalation. To facilitate the best evolutionary path for
future activities, it provides recommendations in the
areas of current priorities, authorities, strategic engagement, multi-role modeling, and other paradigms
and factors to consider in future examinations of
the topic.

xi

AUTHOR’S NOTE
When this monograph was initially completed
in August 2012, the capstone doctrine document for
U.S. military cyberspace operations—Joint Publication
(JP) 3-12, Joint Cyberspace Operations—was a classified document. On October 21, 2014, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff released JP 3-12(R), Cyberspace Operations, an
unclassified version of the earlier doctrine document
that is posted on the unclassified public access government website “Joint Electronic Library” (available
from www.dtic.mil/doctrine/). Please note that the cover
of the unclassified version retains the original classified release date of February 5, 2013, but its contents
do not include an explanatory note as to when, how,
and why this declassification was made.
In general terms, the information in this monograph
is consistent with the details contained in JP 3-12(R),
and thus this monograph has not been modified to
assess and incorporate this recent release. However,
a diagram from JP 3-12 (R) that depicts typical joint
cyberspace command and control organizational relationships is included as Figure A-1 in the Appendix to
complement the information contained in Figures 1, 2,
and 3 of this monograph.
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ARMY SUPPORT OF MILITARY
CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS:
JOINT CONTEXTS AND GLOBAL
ESCALATION IMPLICATIONS
Military cyberspace operations have been ongoing since before the advent of the Internet. Such operations have evolved significantly over the past 2 decades and are now emerging into the realm of military
operations in the traditional domains of land, sea, and
air. The goal of this monograph is to provide senior
policymakers, decisionmakers, military leaders, and
their respective staffs with a better understanding
of Army cyberspace operations within the context of
overall U.S. military cyberspace operations. To accomplish this, it first looks at the evolution of Department of Defense (DoD) cyberspace operations over
the past decade. Next, it examines the evolution of
the Army implementation of cyberspace operations.
Finally, it explores the role of cyberspace operations
in the escalation of international conflict. The scope of
discussion is at the survey level of detail to provide
an overall appreciation for the complex and dynamic
nature of evolving cyberspace operations. It is limited
to unclassified and open source information; any classified discussion must occur at an appropriate venue.
Although the details contained herein are largely focused on military applications, the reader must realize
that whole-of-government efforts are essential for the
successful implementation of national security efforts
in cyberspace.
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EVOLUTION OF MILITARY CYBERSPACE
OPERATIONS
This section examines the founding of the U.S. Cyber Command from its roots in various military units
focused on defensive and offensive cyberspace operations. It reviews the initial operation of the command
under the leadership of General Keith Alexander as
well as its current operations led by Admiral Michael
Rogers. Also, it assesses the command’s mission to
direct operations, defend networks, and, on order,
conduct full spectrum operations with respect to its
appropriateness and adeptness for the command and
control of military cyberspace forces.
The Founding of U.S. Cyber Command.
The formal establishment of military units dedicated to cyberspace missions is mostly a phenomenon
of the 21st century. This section will look at how the
defensive and offensive aspects of cyberspace operations evolved until they were merged under U.S.
Cyber Command.
Defensive Cyberspace: Joint Task Force-Global
Network Operations.
In the last years of the 20th century, DoD began
to form the forerunners of a dedicated cyberspace
force. In December 1998, Secretary of Defense William
Cohen approved formation of the Joint Task ForceComputer Network Defense (JTF-CND) to “serve as
the focal point with the Department of Defense to organize a united effort to defend its computer networks
and systems” based on needs demonstrated by “de-
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fense exercises and real world events in 1997 and in
early 1998.”1 These events included the DoD Eligible
Receiver 1997 exercise as well as the hacking incidents
known as Solar Sunrise and Moonlight Maze.2 JTFCND was collocated with the Global Operations and
Security Center of the Defense Information Systems
Agency (DISA) in Washington, DC, and was given the
initial mission to be responsible for operations on DoD
computer systems and networks as well as coordinating these efforts with the interagency and commercial
communities.3
The initial cadre was small at 10 personnel assigned
and only 24 assigned when full operational capability
was achieved in June 1999. At first, the JTF-CND was
not assigned to a unified command, so its commander
reported through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to the Secretary of Defense.4 The first commander,
Major General John Campbell, recognized there was
no connection with services and regional warfighting
commanders, and the interim command arrangement
evolved quickly.5 Within a year, JTF-CND was placed
under the U.S. Space Command with responsibilities
that included DoD-wide defense actions to stop computer network attack (CNA) and computer network
exploitation (CNE) efforts and to mitigate the effects
of any successful attacks.6
In April 2001, the offensive cyberspace role of computer network attack was assigned to U.S. Space Command, and the JTF-CND was renamed to Joint Task
Force-Computer Network Operations (JTF-CNO).7
The new commander, Major General James Bryan,
was also dual-hatted as Vice Director, DISA. He described the new organization and reporting structure
to Congress in May 2001:
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Sir, Joint Task Force-CNO is, in fact, that one-stop operational command for the Department of Defense for
both offense and defense. It is important to remember
that we may be a one-stop shop for operational coordination; but without the cooperation of the services
and the agencies to include law enforcement as part
of one team, the JTF could not do its job as well as
we do. But it certainly answers the question as to who
is in charge, and this operational accountability now
flows from the President to the Secretary of Defense to
General Eberhardt, who is CINCSPACE, to me.8

On January 10, 2003, President George W. Bush
signed Change-2 to the 2002 Unified Command Plan,
which included the merging of U.S. Space Command
and the existing U.S. Strategic Command into the
“new” U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) under which JTF-CNO was realigned.9 By April 2004, the
first Concept of Operations for network operations
(NetOps) for the DoD global information grid (GIG)
was approved. The roles of defensive and offensive
cyberspace activities were refined during this period
such that in July 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld changed JTF-CNO to Joint Task ForceGlobal Network Operations (JTF-GNO).10 The first
JTF-GNO commander was the director of DISA, Lieutenant General Harry Raduege, Jr., who later noted:
For the first time in network operations and cybersecurity history, command lines were established from the
secretary of defense to the STRATCOM commander,
to the JTF-GNO commander, to each of the appointed
component commanders within the military services
and representatives within the combatant commands
and defense agencies. This framework provides an
important governance model for optimally operating
and defending Defense Department networks through
an established command structure.11
4

After the inaugural year of operations, USSTRATCOM commander, General James Cartwright, approved a revised Concept of Operations (CONOPS) to
capture lessons learned for JTF-GNO on August 15,
2005. The CONOPS noted that the NetOps primary
mission to operate and defend the DoD’s critical information backbone—the GIG—is explicitly an ongoing
one: “Unlike many missions that are deemed successful at a defined completion date, the NetOps mission is
perpetual, requiring continual support to be successful.”12 To accomplish this, the CONOPS envisioned
six critical capabilities to be employed across the spectrum of DoD operations at the strategic, operational,
and tactical levels: visibility; monitoring and analysis;
planning; coordinating and responding; management
and administration; and control.13
Some of the practical aspects of the revised
CONOPS were its delineation of NetOps within the
context of joint and Service organizations. It also distinguished between NetOp events (activities that may
impact operational readiness of the GIG) at the theater
level and global level. NetOps Events with effects limited to a specific theater’s operations—Theater NetOp
Events—would be under the control of the appropriate geographic commander in the supported role,
receiving necessary support from USSTRATCOM
and JTF-GNO. For NetOps Events with the potential
to impact the GIG across multiple theaters—Global
NetOps Events—the commander, USSTRATCOM,
would be the supported commander and would issue
orders through to JTF-GNO to combatant commands,
services, and agencies via established support and
command centers.14
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The command and control structure for addressing NetOps Events utilized NetOps Control Centers
at the theater level (TNCC), global level (GNCC), and
joint level (JNCC). The CONOPS called for TNCCs at
U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command,
U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and
U.S. Southern Command:
to lead, prioritize, and direct Theater GIG assets and
resources to ensure they are optimized to support the
GCC’s [geographic combatant command’s] assigned
missions and operations, and to advise the COCOM
[combatant command] of the ability of the GIG to support current and future operations.15

As part of their Global NetOps Event responsibilities,
a GNCC would provide support to functional combatant commands (FCCs), such as U.S. Transportation
Command “to advise the FCC and ensure the portion
of the GIG resources supporting that Commander’s
assigned missions and operations are optimized.”16
The CONOPS also had service and interagency
provisions as well as JNCCs to support a joint task
force (JTF) commander by managing “the tactical communications of the joint force, serving as the NOSC
[Network Operations and Security Center] for the
deployed portion of the GIG supporting a JTF.”17 To
orchestrate all of these functions, the JTF-GNO commander was assigned several critical responsibilities
to ensure proper operation and defense of the GIG,
which in turn supported the missions of combatant
commands, services, and agencies as well as those of
the President and Secretary of Defense.18
Finally, the CONOPS set the expectation and measure of merit for its support to the warfighter simply
as “the effectiveness of NetOps will be measured in
6

terms of availability and reliability of net-centric services, across all domains, in adherence to agreed-upon
service levels and policies.”19 The tenets of the 2005
CONOPS continued to mature through daily operations for several years pursuing a challenge that was
conveyed in the December 2008 DoD NetOps Strategic Vision, which strived for the GIG to operate “as a
single, unified, agile, and adaptive enterprise capable
of providing responsive and resilient support to multiple simultaneous mission areas under uncertain and
changing conditions.”20 To address this challenge, the
DoD Chief Information Officer set three goals: share
GIG situational awareness; unify GIG command and
control; and institutionalize NetOps.21 Also, the broad
responsibilities regarding NetOps for combatant commands expressed in the USSTRATCOM CONOPS
were formally institutionalized as an integral part of
the GIG by DoD that month as well.22
Offensive Cyberspace: Joint Functional Component
Command-Network Warfare.
In 2003, around the same time that JTF-CNO was
adjusting its organization to the reporting chain in
USSTRATCOM, the DoD offensive cyberspace mission of network attack was transferred to a Network
Attack Support Staff also under the operational control of USSTRATCOM but collocated with the National Security Agency (NSA).23 By January 2005, this staff
evolved to become the Joint Functional Component
Command—Network Warfare (JFCC-NW).24 The Director of the NSA was designated as the commander
of JFCC-NW and thus the offensive cyberspace mission was separated from the defensive cyberspace
mission carried out by the Director of DISA in the role
of commander, JTF-GNO.25 The 2005 USSTRATCOM
7

NetOps CONOPS defined the primary responsibilities
of JFCC-NW as “planning, integrating and coordinating computer network warfare capabilities and integrating with all necessary computer network defense
and exploitation capabilities.”26
Further details of the capabilities and implementation of offensive cyberspace operations remain
classified. For public dissemination, Lieutenant General Keith Alexander (Director, NSA and commander, JFCC-NW) summed up the state of cyberspace
operations in a 2007 article as:
We [USSTRATCOM] have redefined our cyberspace
mission area in terms of offensive—network warfare
(NW) and defensive—network operations (NetOps)—
and established JFCC-NW and JTF-GNO to address
each of those mission sets, respectively.
USSTRATCOM has also begun to develop tactics,
techniques, and procedures and other concepts designed to integrate cyberspace capabilities into crossmission strike plans. We are developing concepts to
address warfighting in cyberspace in order to assure
freedom of action in cyberspace for the United States
and our allies while denying adversaries and providing cyberspace-enabled effects to support operations
in other domains. These concepts, and the cyberspace
effects that they focus on, are clearly based on the military concepts of strike, fires (supporting and suppressing), and defense.27

This arrangement of two three-star general commanders reporting separately to USSTRATCOM was
streamlined in late-2008 when operational command
of JTF-GNO was placed under JFCC-NW.28 This
change was intended to “close the seams between information assurance, network operations and defense,
intelligence collection and offensive operations.”29
8

The Trigger Event—Operation BUCKSHOP YANKEE.
In the fall of 2010, the world learned of a previously classified cyberspace operation through an
article in Foreign Affairs by Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn III. Calling the 2008 incident
“the most significant breach of U.S. military computers ever,” Lynn went on to note that “the Pentagon’s
operation to counter the attack, known as Operation
BUCKSHOT YANKEE, marked a turning point in
U.S. cyber-defense strategy.”30 Part of this strategy included the formation of a new sub-unified command
under USSTRATCOM—U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM).31 The creation of USCYBERCOM was
directed in a June 23, 2009, memorandum by Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates. The new command would
incorporate the existing elements of DoD cyberspace
such as service component and agency connections.
In doing this, Gates also directed the disestablishment
of JTF-GNO and JFCC-NW as their functions were
subsumed into USCYBERCOM. 32
The first commander of USCYBERCOM, General
Keith Alexander, in testimony to Congress in September 2010, recapped the events from Operation BUCKSHOT YANKEE up through initial operational capability of the new command as well as how its structure
would greatly enhance future cyberspace operations.
At that time [2008], we had the defense and the operations in one command, under the Joint Task ForceGlobal Network Operations. And that task force got
one level of intelligence and could see one part of the
network.
Operating on the other side was the Joint Functional
Component Command-Net Warfare, trained at a dif-
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ferent level with different intel insights at a different
classification level, same network, two organizations.
And if you are operating at the National Training Center, you wouldn’t have the defensive team out there
defending and then take them off the field and run out
with an offensive team. It is the same team.
And so the good thing that we have done here is we
have brought those two together, merged those, and I
think that is key to the success here. We need that to
operate as one team. The offense and defense cannot
be different here, because these operations will occur
in real time. And I think we have to be prepared to
do that.33

Initial USCYBERCOM Operations.
Secretary of Defense Gates set very aggressive
dates for USCYBERCOM establishment: initial operating capability by October 2009 and full operational
capability by October 2010.34 Although the first operational milestone was not achieved until May 21, 2010,
USCYBERCOM was declared fully operational, which
included the formal disestablishment of JTF-GNO and
JFCC-NW.35 The USCYBERCOM mission was threefold: enable DoD network operations; conduct military cyberspace operations; and ensure freedom of
action in cyberspace.36
Figure 1 depicts the interim structures of the developing USCYBERCOM within the larger context of
DoD cyberspace. Working in parallel to the joint efforts, each military service was also tasked to develop
and establish cyberspace commands to support USCYBERCOM. By October 2010, the following component support commands were in place: Army Cyber
Command; Fleet Cyber Command, 10th Fleet; Marine
Forces Cyber; and 24th Air Force.
10

Figure 1. USCYBERCOM Formation and
DoD Cyber Organization (March 2010).37
Consistent with the vision put forth in the Foreign
Affairs article by Deputy Secretary Lynn, General Alexander confirmed the initial direction of the first USCYBERCOM was set in three main lines of operation:
defense of the Global Information Grid; execution of
full-spectrum cyber operations on command; and defense of U.S. freedom of action in cyberspace. He also
reiterated five principles for the initial strategy of DoD
cyberspace:
•	Remember that cyberspace is a defensible domain.
• Make our defense active.
• Extend protection to our critical infrastructure.
• Foster collective defenses.
• Leverage U.S. technological advantages.38
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What was the vision for the practical application of
these principles in military terms? General Alexander
emphasized that the need for the command to focus
on operating jointly in support of the combatant commanders.39 This cyberspace support to the deployed
warfighter was facilitated using Cyber Support Elements (CSEs) for combatant commanders and Expeditionary CSEs (ExCSEs) for joint task force commanders. These teams are scalable in size and composition
to best meet mission requirements as well as establish
working relationships with the directorates of intelligence (J2), operations (J3), and planning (J5). Regarding ExCSE activities that support ongoing operations,
General Alexander testified to Congress in 2010 that:
Currently, USCYBERCOM has two ExCSEs teams deployed—one in Iraq and one in Afghanistan. The teams
consist of five personnel: a team chief (lead planner),
a cyber attack planner, a cyber defense planner, and
two analysts (cyber and intelligence). USCYBERCOM
embeds these teams within the supported Joint Task
Force headquarters (typically J3 Directorate—Operations) to enable the delivery of cyber effects in support
of the commander’s priorities.40

The USCYBERCOM commander would also lead
the National Security Agency (NSA) and Central Security Service, thus adding in the traditional communities of national security cryptology, signals intelligence, and information assurance into the cyberspace
operations mix. Although this puts a great amount of
responsibility under the purview of a single leader,
General Alexander argued that it made sense for resource stewardship and unity of effort.41 From a force
structure view, this included the incorporation of
existing task-specific support teams, such as:
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Green Teams to respond to cyber incidents; Blue
Teams that provide in-depth review and resolution of
cyber events; and Red Teams that emulate adversary
procedures against DoD hosts to train defenders and
identify vulnerabilities for mitigation.42

Current Joint Cyberspace Operations.
In January 2012, President Barack Obama and
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta gave DoD new
strategic guidance for sustaining U.S. global leadership in the 21st century. This guidance centered on
10 primary mission areas where “the Joint Force will
need to recalibrate its capabilities and make selective additional investments to succeed,” which includes efforts
to ensure protection and resiliency for cyberspace operations.43 Under General Alexander’s leadership, USCYBERCOM pursued five broad command priorities
to address the mandate: (1) Trained and Ready Cyber
Forces; (2) Operational Concept; (3) Global Situational
Awareness; (4) Defensible Architecture; and (5) Policies and Procedures to Enable Action.44
Admiral Michael S. Rogers assumed command of
USCYBERCOM on April 3, 2014, and since then, he
has kept the command focused on the same five priorities.45 In a June 2014 speech, he highlighted how the
Joint Information Environment (JIE) will provide a
truly defensible network for warfighters once it is fully
mature and noted that the JIE structure is currently being implemented in Europe.46 He also provided details
on the planned structures for trained and ready cyber
forces. Consistent with the cyber force envisioned in
the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review,47 Admiral Rogers
called for a team structure of approximately 6,000 cyber professionals divided into 133 teams across three
mission areas: Cyber National Mission Force respon13

sible for depending national critical infrastructure;
Cyber Combat Mission Force responsible for cyber
support to combatant commanders; and Cyber Protection Forces responsible for operating and defending the DoD information network (DoDIN).48 Table 1
depicts how these teams might be aggregated to form
notional companies, battalions, and squadrons.
Current Cyberspace Mission Forces
2014
Quadrennial Defense
Review
133 Total Teams

13 National Mission Teams with 8 National Support Teams
27 Combat Mission Teams with 17 Combat Support Teams
18 National Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs)
24 Service CPTs
26 Combatant Command and DoD information Network CPTs

6,000 Pax
National Basic Types of Cyberspace Units (USCYBERCOM, October 2013)
1 x C2 Element
• Provide C2 and management
Cyber National
Mission
Battalion/Squadron

5 x Cyber National Mission Teams (CNMT) (64 Pax each)
• Base unit for cyber operations
• Conduct OCO/DCO/DGO
• Sustained and surge operations
• Trained, certified, and fights as a team

Mission: See, Block,
Maneuver in Red and Grey
space to deny adversary
objectives and, if authorized, strike to destroy the
capability.

5 x Direct Support Teams (DST) (39 Pax each)
• Provides direct support to CNMTs
• Conduct intel and malware analysis
•P
 erform immediate tool development / modification and
access maintenance
• Conduct target discovery / analysis
• Provide language analysis
• Planning and synchronization
•N
 SA initial weight to DTN DSTs, then shifting to CCMD
support as capacity grows.

Table 1. Cyberspace Force Presentation.49
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1 x C2 Element
• Provide C2 and cyber management for CCMD (OPCON)
1-6 x Cyber Combat Mission Teams (CCMT) (64 Pax each)
Cyber Combat Mission
Battalion/Squadron

• Base unit for offensive cyber operations
• L arge Scale ops CCMF has all CCMT specialties, others
less
• Trained, certified, and fights as a team

Mission: Target development in support of CCMD
operations plans and,
when authorized, the delivery of cyber effects against
CCMD targets, followed
by assessment of effects.
OPCON to CCMDs under
current “Transitional” C2
model.

1-2 x Direct Support Teams (DST) (39 Pax each)
• One DST per 3-5 CCMT
• More target region specific skills
•P
 erform immediate tool development / modification and
access maintenance
• Conduct target discovery and analysis
• Provide language analysis
• Planning and synchronization
2-6 x Cyber Protection Platoons

Cyber Protection
Company / Troop

• Each Platoon has its own organic C2 element
• Each Platoon has 5 squads (see below)
• Conduct CND; tips to CNA; Penetration testing
• Trained, certified, and operates as a team

Mission: Defense of the
GIG and employing teams
to assist outside the
GIG when required and
authorized.

5 x Protection Squads / Platoons
• Task organized, trained and certified
• Assesses Cyber Security Posture
• Bolsters Cyber Defenses
• Conducts Counter-Cyber Ops
• Performs Cyber Threat Emulation (CTE)
• Conducts intel and malware analysis

Table 1. Cyberspace Force Presentation. (cont.)

15

As Cyber National Mission Force teams are being
established, their techniques and procedures are also
being developed through daily operations and exercises. Many of these exercises require coordination
across multiple lines of authority, such as the Cyber
Guard 14-1 exercise conducted over 2 weeks in July
2014 “designed to test operational and interagency coordination as well as tactical-level operations to protect, prevent, mitigate and recover from a domestic
cyberspace incident.” 50
Cyber Combat Mission Force teams are also refining their methods for providing support to combatant
commanders. As depicted in Figure 2, USCYBERCOM
CSEs help to coordinate cyber support through joint
component commanders, joint task force commanders, and the combatant commander’s Joint Cyber Center. Specific operational requests may be in the form
of the Cyber Effects Request Format (CERF) process,
which “initiates cyber effects planning across all lines
of operation.”51 Warfighters may also use a Joint Cyber Strike Request that “sets the timing and tempo to
integrate cyber effects/fires with the supported Joint
Force Commander’s operation.”52 For planning and
execution of these requests, “CDRUSCYBERCOM
[Commander, USCYBERCOM] deconflicts fires delivered in and through cyberspace.”53
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Figure 2. USCYBERCOM Support to
Combatant Commands.54
From a doctrinal viewpoint, all of the cyberspace
operations for warfighters should fall into three mission areas: DoDIN Operations, Defensive Cyberspace
Operations (DCO), and Offensive Cyberspace Operations (OCO). DCO is bifurcated into DCO-Internal Defensive Measures (IDM) and DCO-Response Actions
(RA).55 Figure 3 depicts the notional relationship of
these functions with regard to cyberspace missions
and support teams.
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Figure 3. Cyberspace Operations Functional
Relationships.56
Examining further details of these functions quickly leads to classified material that is inappropriate for
this monograph. A capstone joint doctrine publication,
Joint Publication (JP) 3-12, Joint Cyberspace Operations,
was released in February 2013 for cyberspace operations for those readers with appropriate clearance and
need to know. The unclassified synopsis states that
the publication seeks to address “the uniqueness of
military operations in cyberspace, clarify cyberspace
operations-related command and operational interrelationships, and incorporate operational lessons
learned.”57
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EVOLUTION OF ARMY CYBERSPACE
OPERATIONS
Having examined the evolution of joint cyberspace
operations, this section focuses on parallel evolutionary efforts in Army cyberspace operations toward the
establishment of Army Cyber Command. It examines
initial operations of the command under the leadership of Lieutenant General Rhett Hernandez as well
as its current operations led by Lieutenant General
Edward Cardon. This includes a brief review of recent
efforts to establish Fort Gordon, Georgia as the center
of gravity for Army cyberspace activities.
The Founding of Army Cyberspace Operations.
Just a few years before the formation of JTF-CND,
the Army was making organizational changes to begin
consolidating the operational of information systems.
Since May 1984, the U.S. Army Information Systems
Command (ISC) provided the service-wide management of five information disciplines: communications;
automation; records management; printing and publishing; and visual information. Based on the perceived
need for better control over regional communication
and computer systems by Army major commands
and theater commanders, ISC was disbanded, and the
Army Signal Command created in September 1996.
During the next 6 years, the command focused on strategic signal support to Army combat units worldwide.
However, these units were equipped and resourced
at the major command or theater level with little coordination. Thus, the Army-wide information system
became increasingly nonstandard in their equipment
and protocols at a time when threats to the system
were growing more complex and widespread.58
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To address these issues, the U.S. Army Network
Enterprise Technology Command/9th Army Signal
Command (NETCOM/9th ASC) was established in
August 2002. Its mission was to “operate, manage,
and defend the Army’s ‘Infostructure’ at the enterprise level” to provide “Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Information Technology
common user services and signal warfighting forces
in support of the Army, its Army service Component
Commanders, and the Combatant Commanders.”
This included operation and defense of the Army’s
portion of the GIG.59
The USSTRATCOM 2005 CONOPS for GIG
NetOps identified the Commander, U.S. Army Space
and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC)/Army
Forces Strategic Command (ARSTRAT) as the Army
service component to JTF-GNO.60 The Army NetOps
structure had three tiers: (1) the central command element of the Army Network Operations and Security
Center (ANOSC), referred to in the CONOPS as the
Service Global Network Operations and Security Center (SGNOSC); (2) the combatant command support
elements of the Theater Network Operations and Security Centers, referred to in the CONOPS as the Service
Theater Network Operations and Security Centers;
and support elements within theater of the Regional
Network Operations and Security Centers.61 Figure 4
depicts how the Army implemented this three-tiered
structure across the five geographic combatant commands. The ANOSC62 (or SGNOSC) at Fort Belvoir,
VA, provided “decisionmakers a comprehensive, integrated, near real-time, situational awareness, [and]
operational reporting capability” as well as “worldwide operational and technical support to the LandWarNet across the tactical and strategic levels.”63
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Figure 4. U.S. Army NetOps Forces (Circa 2005).64
In October 2006, the army reinforced the
NETCOM/9th ASC mission and redesignated it
as the U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Command/9th Signal Command (Army)
(NETCOM/9th SC (A)). Its mission was clarified to
formally include network-centric operations in context of the LandWarNet by executing:
globally based and expeditionary communications
capabilities to enable joint and combined battle command, leveraging the information grid to ensure extension and reachback capabilities to the warfighter.

It was to accomplish this “through globally postured
theater signal commands, brigades, and regional information managers.”65
Perhaps a good example of warfighter support facilitated by NetOps using the GIG is that of friendly
force tracking (FFT). Originally called blue force
21

tracking, the initial aim of the program was for U.S.
Space Command to use national technical means “to
provide a beyond line-of-sight, low probability of
detection and interception, precise location of Special Operations Forces elements.”66 When U.S. Space
Command merged with U.S. Strategic Command
in 2002, the FFT mission operational control transitioned to USASMDC/ARSTRAT. In December 2008,
the USSTRATCOM FFT mission was refined and
USASMDC/ARSTRAT was given responsibility “to
provide FFT data services on a continuous basis to
combatant commands” and interagency and coalition
users (when directed) as well as “to provide a combat development capability integrating FFT data into
current and planned architectures for use on the appropriate Common Operating Picture.”67 The system
has now become so integrated into joint operations
that it may be taken for granted. Its continued success
depends on coordinated NetOps support to generate,
collect, process, disseminate, and display joint FFT
information to warfighters worldwide.68
The 2009 version of the U.S. Army Posture Statement contained a summary of the Army’s evolving
cyber operations, which included descriptions of
the NETCOM/9th SC defensive cyberspace focus of
NetOps as well as the Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) offensive cyberspace focus
of network warfare. By this time, Army cyberspace
operations had been:
integrated throughout Service and Joint Force structure, from strategic levels such as the Defense Information Service Agency, Joint Task Force-GNO,
NSA, and Joint Functional Component CommandNetwork Warfare down to the Brigade Combat Team
(BCT) level.
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This included forward-based forces within theater
signal commands, military intelligence brigades, and
planning elements.69
Initial Army Cyber Command Operations.
In May 2009, the Army established a cyberspace task
force to examine how to organize the service’s cyberspace assets to support the anticipated establishment
of a sub-unified command in USSTRATCOM dedicated to cyberspace operations. Specifically, the task force
would synchronize the cyberspace-related activities of
the Army Staff Intelligence/G-2, Operations/G-3, and
Chief Information Officer/G-6. More importantly, it
would examine if existing organizations (i.e., NETCOM, INSCOM, or USASMDC/ARSTRAT) could
best provide the headquarters functions to direct the
Army’s existing cyberspace operation capabilities, or
if a new command should be established. When Defense Secretary Gates issued his June 2009 memorandum to establish USCYBERCOM, the Army opted to
retain USASMDC/ARSTRAT as the interim choice for
U.S. Army Forces Cyber Command (ARFORCYBER).70
At that time, the organization of Army cyberspace
forces was largely the same as it had been described
in the 2005 USSTRATCOM CONOPS, with a central
command element and Theater Network Operations
and Security Centers (TNOSCs) as well as Army Computer Emergency Response Teams (ACERTs). The
Army Global Network Operations and Security Center (AGNOSC) remained essential to warfighting as
“the Army’s global eyes and ears in cyberspace . . . actively defending the Army’s operational and generating force information capabilities from a continuously
evolving, adaptive enemy.” Also, TNOSCs continued their mission to “direct the operations, manage23

ment and defense of the Army’s portion of the link to
the GIG.” 71
In February 2010, based on “the increasing global
scope of the cyberspace mission,” the Army chief of
staff approved the establishment of a separate command for ARFORCYBER.72 In June 2010, it was announced that Major General Rhett A. Hernandez
would be the new ARFORCYBER commander with
the task of achieving Army Cyber Command full operational capability by October 2010. While the roles of
NETCOM/9th SC (A) and INSCOM remained largely
unchanged, a new nerve center for Army cyberspace
operations was created: the Army Cyber Operations
and Integration Center (ACOIC).73 With functions
similar to those of the previous AGNOSC, the ACOIC
was designed not only to provide Army forces with
“clear, concise, and timely direction to execute full
spectrum operations in cyberspace” but also to coordinate Army cyberspace operations and “to share
information with other Army commands, our counterparts in the other services, and the U.S. Cyberspace
Joint Operations Center.” To facilitate this integration,
some ACOIC personnel were physically embedded
with the USCYBERCOM joint staff.74
As the organization charts were being redrawn
for ongoing Army cyberspace operations, the Army
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) began
a “Cyberspace/Electromagnetic Contest” capabilities
based assessment in February 2010.75 TRADOC also
published the “Cyber Operations Concept Capability
Plan 2016-2028” in February 2010 as the:
first step in developing a common understanding of
how technological advancements transform the operational environment, how leaders must think about
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cyberspace operations, how they should integrate
their overall operations, and which capabilities are
needed.76

The report assessed that “the Army’s current vocabulary, including terms such as computer network
operations (CNO), electronic warfare (EW), and information operations (IO) will become increasingly inadequate.”77 It posited three interrelated dimensions of
full spectrum operations built upon these elements:
one of “psychological contest of wills;” a second of
“strategic engagement;” and the third dimension of
“the cyber-electromagnetic contest”—the focus of the
plan.78 Arguing that cyberspace operations (Cyber
Ops) was more than the CNO and NetOps, the plan introduced “four components for CyberOps: CyberSA,
CyNetOps, CyberWar, and CyberSpt, with CyberWar
and CyNetOps being the primary operational components.”79 The plan went on to develop an initial matrix
of required capabilities for each element in the areas of
doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership
and education, personnel, and facilities.80
As planned, Army Cyber Command was established on October 1, 2010,81 with a split-cased scheme
that had its headquarters at Fort Belvoir, and select
staff elements located with or near USCYBERCOM at
Fort Meade, MD.82 Its mission was threefold: to lead
the planning and implementation of Army NetOps
and defense of Army networks; when directed, to
conduct cyberspace operations to ensure freedom of
action in cyberspace and to deny the same to adversaries; and to report, assess, and mitigate Army cyberspace incidents.83
Over the next year, several modifications were implemented to the initial U.S. Army Cyber command
(ARCYBER) organizations. In February 2011, Sec25

retary of the Army John M. McHugh issued a directive that the Army IO mission transfer to ARCYBER.
Along with this new mission, ARCYBER received
operational control over the 1st Information Operations Command (Land), which included IO support
to warfighters using deployable teams that could leverage reach-back planning and analysis as well as
synchronize and conduct CNO tasks. 84 In October
2011, the 780th Military Intelligence Brigade became
ARCYBER’s cyber brigade to serve as the command’s
“operational arm for full-spectrum cyberspace operations.”85 As such, the brigade was “organized to
support USCC [USCYBERCOM] and combatant command cyberspace operations” as well as to conduct
“signals intelligence and computer network operations, and enables Dynamic Computer Network Defense of Army and DoD networks.”86 ARCYBER also
established the Army Cyberspace Proponent Office
“to define the Army’s future cyberspace force; design
its organizations; establish the requirements to build
it (both technological and human); and to develop the
overarching cyberspace doctrine and operational constructs.”87 The command relationships resulting from
these first-year changes are depicted in Figure 5.
During the first year of operation, ARCYBER did
much to advance Army cyberspace operations along
three lines of effort: operationalizing cyberspace; growing Army cyber capacity and capabilities; and recruiting, developing, and retaining Army cyber professionals. At a public conference in August 2011, Lieutenant
General Hernandez discussed nine major accomplishments for the year that highlighted progress in the operationalization and unity of effort within the command.
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Figure 5. U.S. Army Cyber Command/Second
Army (Circa 2011).88
Although these were significant steps forward, there
still remained considerable work to achieve the commander’s vision “to effectively defend our networks
and deter and oppose our adversaries” as well as “to
enable cyberspace activities under various authorities
to work in concert with each other to more effectively
support cyber operations.”89 Fundamental first steps
in achieving these goals include improving our ability
to see and understand our networks better. We will
do this by collapsing our networks from a disparate,
loose federation into one Army enterprise network.
This will enable us to establish centralized control of
our networks and give us more complete, integrated
visibility into them. Having accomplished this, we
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can then establish an active defense in depth across
the network.
Current Army Cyberspace Operations.
Looking toward the future, the 2012 Army Posture
Statement identified three essential cyberspace elements to fulfill the needs of the dynamic information
environment of 2020: a cyberspace enterprise; a “combined arms” cyberspace force; and integration, planning, and synchronization of cyberspace effects.90 To
fully incorporate these cyberspace elements into full
spectrum operations, three cyberspace imperatives
were set forth in the areas of personnel, cross-domain
operations, and integrated operations. The personnel
focus is to pursue “the development of Cyberspace
Warriors and cyberspace formations to gain physical,
temporal, and psychological advantages over an enemy will enable freedom of movement in, from, and
through cyberspace.”91 The second imperative seeks
to make cyberspace operations “routine and pervasive” given that “the Army will embrace cross-domain
synergy between land and cyberspace. Cyberspace
operations will be a critical part of ‘How the Army
Fights’.”92 The third imperative is probably the most
challenging since it deals with several evolving mission areas: “Army Cyber will integrate and synchronize cyberspace operations with electronic warfare,
electromagnetic spectrum operations, information operations, and space operations to achieve commander’s objectives to ensure mission command.”93
ARCYBER continued to evolve with efforts to address capability gaps identified in TRADOC’s Cyber/
Electromagnetic Capability Based Assessment. These
included:
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increase our [ARCYBER] World Class Cyber Opposition Force (WCCO) capacity to provide realistic, challenging cyberspace training in the conduct of Unified
Land Operations to exercises, Home Station Training,
and Combat Training Centers; increase our capability
to conduct active defense of Army Networks through
“Hunt Teams” that can find, fix, and mitigate currently un-detected malicious actors already inside the
DoD infrastructure; provide capability to integrate cyberspace operations into Regional Army Land operations to support commanders’ tactical and operational
cyber planning and integration; increase intelligence
personnel to support Army Cyber Command’s operations Center, and improve our capability for rapid development of network defense tools; increase capacity
to conduct our ability to conduct force modernization
for cyberspace operations by developing requirements
and solutions.94

In addition to these areas, ARCYBER also made
progress in building relationships with allies and
partner nations through participation in operational
planning and Theater Security Cooperation effort
with combatant commands.
In September 2013, ARCYBER/2nd Army welcomed its second commander, Lieutenant General
Edward C. Cardon, who continued to build on the
foundation created by Lieutenant General Hernandez.
In his initial assessment of the command, Lieutenant
General Cardon identified the three greatest continuing challenges as “building cyber capability and capacity; transitioning to a more defensible platform;
and gaining situational awareness in cyberspace.”95
In March 2014, the Army affirmed its commitment
to unity of effort in cyberspace operations and refined
the command relationships: making ARCYBER an
Army Force Component Headquarters; designating
29

2nd Army as a direct reporting unit; and assigning
NETCOM/9th SC (A) to 2nd Army, with Commander, NETCOM dual-hatted as the Deputy Commanding
General, 2nd Army.96 Figure 6 depicts the command
relationship of this time frame.

Figure 6. U.S. Army Cyber Command/Second
Army (Circa 2014).97
After leading the command for 6 months, Lieutenant General Cardon offered additional refinements
into these challenge areas, focusing on limitations of
existing information architectures and cyber training as well as more strategic issues of risk assessment
and authorities to match operating concepts. At the
operational level, he discussed cyberspace operations
in terms of maneuver on “cyber terrain” where one
could replace traditional maps with “roads as [information] transport—fiber, satellite links, wireless.
Think of the intersections as routers and switches, and
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think of the buildings as endpoints or people with mobile devices.”98 In such a schema, ARCYBER needs to
recognize “there’s a real nexus between land, cyber,
and the human domains.” At the strategic level, he
noted that “cyber’s a domain and it must be integrated
with other domains to provide options to the National
Command Authority.”99
To help address these myriad tasks, ARCYBER
is applying the total force concept to current Army
cyberspace operations. For example, the 1st IO Command includes four Reserve Component Theater IO
Groups with deployable capability that “provides IO
and cyberspace planning, analysis and technical reach
back; and offers specialized IO and cyberspace training to assist the warfighter in garrison, during exercises, or in conflict.”100
Army National Guard (ARNG) units also play important cyberspace roles that may leverage technical
experience from their civilian jobs. The Guard’s 2015
Posture Statement summarizes some of the advantages this arrangement offers, to include unique legal
authorities, knowledge of local critical infrastructure,
and experience from work with commercial IT companies.101 A specific application of this concept was
initiated on June 5, 2014 when a memorandum of
understanding was signed between ARCYBER/2nd
Army and the ARNG to have the 1636th Cyber Protection Team serve in active Title 10 status in support of
ARCYBER/2nd Army. The unit may be called upon to
conduct any of the following missions:

31

defensive cyberspace operations, cyber command
readiness inspections, vulnerability assessments, cyber operational forces support to emulate threats, critical infrastructure assessments, theater security cooperation and Federal Emergency Management Agency
support.102

Probably the biggest change on the horizon for
ARCYBER is the pending move of its headquarters to
Fort Gordon, GA. The Army assessed this as the best
option to address the need for additional space once
the command outgrew its facilities at Fort Meade. In
theory, moving to Fort Gordon is the least costly alternative. Also, the collocation of the Army’s operational cyber headquarters with the Army’s Joint Force
Headquarters-Cyber and NSA-Georgia will require
150 fewer personnel.103
Part of the consolidation of Army cyber forces at
Fort Gordon is the establishment of the Army Cyber
Center of Excellence (CoE) there with goals of “aligning Army cyber proponency within TRADOC, creating institutional unity and a focal point for cyber
doctrine and capabilities development, training, and
innovation.”104 In fact, on March 28, 2014, the U.S.
Army Signal CoE became the Army Cyber CoE with
the initial fusion of various elements of cyber, signal,
and electronic warfare training completed by October
2014 and full operating capability achieved by October 2015.105 The new CoE is now responsible for the
development of Army signal and cyber doctrine and
is currently working to produce Field Manual (FM)
3-12, Cyberspace Operations, which will provide “tactics
and procedures for the coordination and integration
of cyberspace operations in support of unified land
operations.”106
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The most significant current Army doctrine regarding cyberspace is FM 3-38, Cyber Electromagnetic
Activities (CEMA), first published in February 2014.
It provides “an overview of principles, tactics, and
procedures on Army integration of CEMA as part of
unified land operations.” Further, it describes how
Army “CEMA are implemented via the integration
and synchronization of cyberspace operations, electronic warfare (EW), and spectrum management operations (SMO).”107 Focusing on Chapter 3 of FM 3-38,
the depiction of the doctrinal concept of cyberspace
operations as three interdependent functions (see
Figure 7) is consistent with terminology of USCYBERCOM.108 While a worthy topic, the detailed analysis of
the CEMA concept depicted in FM 3-38 is beyond the
scope of this monograph.

Figure 7. U.S. Army Cyberspace Operations
Functions.109
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Following the model of the Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) and USCYBERCOM, ARCYBER implements its mission across four team structures: (1) Joint
Force Headquarter-Cyber to provide operational and
tactical planning support to Combatant Commands;
(2) Cyber National Mission Force to defend the nation
by seeing adversary activity, blocking attacks and maneuvering to defeat them; (3) Cyber Protection Force
to defend DODIN and, when authorized, other infrastructure; and (4) Cyber Combat Mission Force to conduct military cyber operations in support of combatant commanders.110 Figure 8 depicts how the goal of
operationalizing cyber is achieved by combining these
teams with the organization shown in Figure 8 and
overlaying them across the ARCYBER mission areas.

Figure 8. U.S. Army Cyberspace Operations
Spectrum.111
A recent example of the continuing evolution of
Army cyber forces to support these team structures is
the 7th Signal Command (Theater) efforts to establish
a new Cyber Mission Unit (Provisional) that will focus
on defensive operations for Army networks. The new
unit will form Cyber Protection Teams to “conduct
global cyberspace operations to deter, disrupt, and
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help defeat the nation’s adversaries in cyberspace.
They will rapidly evaluate, and act proactively and
reactively to dynamic cyber situations.”112
CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS IN A
GLOBAL CONTEXT113
Thus far, this monograph has addressed how cyberspace forces are currently being integrated across
the full spectrum of traditional domain-based military
operations. But is this approach sufficient to address
the full scope of cyberspace operations now and into
the future? This section takes a more theoretical slant
to addressing this question as it examines an international environment of multiple actors interacting with
varying degrees of tension. In such a global situation,
cyberspace operations seeking to produce certain effects must also be examined for their potential to cause
escalation of activities; possibly even up to the point
of existential threat.
When the stakes become this high, then the topic
of national deterrence comes into play. Indeed, one of
the principles to guide development of the Joint Force
of 2020 is to “include a renewed emphasis on the need
for a globally networked approach to deterrence and
warfare.”114 Admiral Rogers during his congressional confirmation hearing for the position of CDRUSCYBERCOM noted that “cyber warfare is a complex
and evolving discipline, and the subject of deterrence
is drawing increasing attention at all levels of government and the Interagency, and in our discussions with
our international partners.”115
A thorough examination of the topic of how all cyberspace operations influence, and are influenced by,
global deterrence consideration may require several

35

volumes of work. Instead, this monograph will introduce a methodology—the modified Herman Kahn
Escalation Ladder—and use it to analyze the specific
case of active cyber defense (ACD) operations. Readers may then modify and apply the analysis framework for their own needs. For our purpose, ACD is
a concept that is currently embodied in the terms cyber defense in depth or DCO-RA.116 The effective use
of ACD as an instrument of national policy is not an
isolated process with defined boundaries. Rather, it
involves intertwined processes that transpire within
a dynamic international environment. Ideally, such
defenses will deter potential aggressors and work to
defeat any who are not deterred. This section explores
how ACD may integrate with traditional military operations across the spectrum of international conflict
as well as how such defenses influence national responses related to deterrence and escalation.
A key aspect in addressing this issue is to explore
such activities in the realm of existential threat, which
traditionally is limited to nuclear warfare. Proper deterrence at this level can serve as an essential element
of an overall risk reduction strategy to keep inevitable
and unpreventable minor cyber incidents from escalating.117 Thus, let us examine defensive and offensive
cyber capabilities in the context of an expanded model for strategic deterrence that embraces and expands
traditional nuclear deterrence. This approach reflects a
more realistic international environment where major
cyber attacks are not considered to be isolated events,
but rather as one instrument among many aimed at
achieving strategic goals.118
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Kahn Model of Escalation and Deterrence.
Current U.S. military doctrine defines deterrence
as “the prevention of action by the existence of a
credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or
belief that the cost of action outweighs the perceived
benefits,” but interestingly, the definition for escalation has been removed.119 This change appropriately
reflects the doctrine’s focus on theater-level military
operations using a six-phase model with a second
phase of “Deter.” The context for strategic deterrence
focuses on influencing the decisionmaking of potential adversaries not to take actions that threaten vital
interests. This is achieved through credible threat of
action in three ways: denying them benefits; imposing
costs; and encouraging constraint.120 Implicit in this
paradigm is the credibility to raise the stakes—escalate the conflict—to a point that is not acceptable by
the adversary.
A famous model developed during the Cold War
was Kahn’s Escalation Ladder that he described as “a
methodological device that provides a convenient list
of the many options facing the strategists in a two-sided confrontation.”121 He illustrated his metaphor as a
ladder with 44 “rungs” grouped into 7 larger crises
regions of increasing intensity separated by distinct
threshold events. His concept is useful to view the
changes in conflict based on the interplay between the
political, diplomatic, and military issues surrounding
the conflict and the level of violence and provocation
at which it occurs.122 Although created in a different
era of conflict, the Kahn ladder can be evolved and
expanded to strategic warfare that includes other
weapons in the deterrence force mix, such as global
conventional strike and offensive cyber operations.123
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The goal is not to replace nuclear forces, but rather, to
develop a more holistic integration of strategic forces.
Simplified Escalation Ladder.
To examine a more integrated deterrence metaphor, let us first simplify the Kahn ladder by limiting
it to the seven major crisis regions and their thresholds. In the original model, the Bizarre Crises region
included five rungs that depict the initiation of actions
related to limited nuclear warfare in various forms.124
Let us divide these regions at the level of Bizarre Crises into a lower half group that encompasses conflict
at the theatre/regional level and an upper half group
that addresses existential conflict (see Figure 9).

Figure 9. Modified Kahn Escalation Ladder.125
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The lower half of the simplified ladder starts with
Subcrises Maneuvering, which consists of political,
economic, and diplomatic gestures, as well as formal
declarations, to demonstrate resolve. When military
forces come into play, the activity crosses the threshold
to Traditional Crises. In this region, activity increases
progressively from shows of force and mobilization,
through harassing acts of violence, and up to dramatic
confrontations. When military forces become the main
focus of conflict, the activity crosses the threshold to
Intense Crises, and the view of nuclear stockpiles
change from hypothetical to realistic threats. In this
region, diplomatic measures support coercion using
provocative acts such as ultimatums, embargos, and
blockades. Conventional conflict increases in its scope
and intensity toward the formal declaration of war
and movement closer to the incorporation of nuclear
weapons.126
The upper half of the simplified escalation ladder
deals with conflict that has escalated to the point of
potential existential threat of nuclear attack. It begins
with Exemplary Central Attacks where nuclear weapons are used in a restrained manner against specific
military, infrastructure, or population targets. As activities progress through the ladder rungs, reciprocal reprisals occur. When military forces become the
main focus of nuclear weapons, the activity crosses
the threshold into Military Central Wars. In this region, military commanders have access to all the
resources of the nation as well as nuclear weapons,
but they use tactics that limit collateral damage to an
opponent’s civilians. Its rungs progress from targeting specific property and forces in equal responses, to
constrained force-reduction attacks, then to increasingly intensive counterforce strikes using nuclear
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weapons. When these counterforce strikes exceed any
attempt to spare civilians, then the activity crosses the
final threshold into Civilian Central War. This is the
region of nightmarish nuclear exchanges that devolve
from “city-trading” attacks of resolve, to purposeful
destruction of the enemy’s society, and ultimately to
the insensate launch of all weapons without regard to
consequences.127
Movement Along the Ladder.
Kahn designed his ladder metaphor to examine
the interrelations between two sets of elements surrounding a given escalation situation—those specific
to the region of the present conditions and those related to the dynamics of moving on the ladder. He
envisioned the ladder to model two-sided escalation
(usually the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) that met certain conditions related
to: commitment of resources; value placed on victory;
interest in systems bargaining to preserve precedents;
motivations and strategies for escalation; desire to appear to be following accepted norms; and danger and
avoidance of upper levels of escalation. He divided
national conduct related to movement on the ladder
into five categories: contractual (quid pro quo); coercive
(stick versus carrot); agonistic (prescriptive rules); stylistic (accepted norms), and familial (positive cultural
aspects). As one might expect, activities in these categories would reflect the use of all elements of national
power (political, economic, information), and thus
Kahn asserted that “mere military superiority will not
necessarily assure ‘escalation dominance’.”128
Admittedly, the paradigm is not perfect. The
movements reflecting escalation are not necessarily
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sequential, symmetric, or reversible. Also, the ladder
is not very useful at illustrating the effects of multiple
simultaneous moves. Any analysis should also recognize that an adversary will also have a ladder (implicit
or explicit) that is likely different in its placement and
perception of conditions. It also assumes the interactions involve rational players in a model that often
fails to fully embrace ambiguity and uncertainty related to acceptable alternatives and long-term stability.129 Regardless, the simplified ladder offers a reasonable framework to examine an integrated strategy of
deterrence.
Examining Escalation and Deterrence.
With the foundation of the simplified escalation
ladder, let us apply it to a broader view of strategic
warfare that includes conventional global strike and
cyber offensive forces in addition to nuclear forces to
provide deterrence across domains. Once this is codified, we can then examine the roles of ACD in the paradigm. To be clear, this is not an examination of a cyber
escalation ladder developed by Dunn Cavelty.130 Nor
is it akin to analysis by Martin Libicki that downplays
valuable lessons from the Cold War and considers
“cyber escalation” largely in isolation.131 Rather, this
analysis addresses a more evolutionary and holistic
view of modern deterrence and warfare with a scope
emphasizing various forms of the military instrument
of power. For the scope of this monograph, examples
of national policies and doctrines will be drawn from
those of the United States.
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Types of Warfare and Factors.
Conflict in the lower half of the simplified ladder involves the evolving forms of conventional and
irregular warfare at the theater/regional level. Military forces are organized, trained, equipped, and employed in traditional domains, but they also adopt
activities in the cyberspace realm as an integral part
of joint operations.132 The U.S. concept of globally integrated operations provides guidance and details for
a force that by 2020 can “quickly combine capabilities
with itself and mission partners across domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations.”133 These would incorporate existing teams
from USCYBERCOM that “operate and defend the
networks that support military operations worldwide” as well as “support combatant commanders
as they execute military missions.”134 Conflicts would
strive to protect national interests and achieve stability in the given region with approaches that adhere
to internationally acceptable norms. Kinetic attacks
would emphasize precision of targeting and delivery
as well as predictable results that are appropriately
limited in first order and collateral effects.
In the upper half of the simplified model, conflict
has escalated to the point where vital national interests are threatened, potentially to the degree of existential vulnerability. To deter or confront such threats,
consider a military force structure that adds protected
conventional strategic strike and offensive cyber capabilities to traditional nuclear forces delivered by aircraft or long-range missiles. This concept developed
by the U.S. Defense Science Board maintains the need
for cyber defense of an overarching nuclear capability
as well as a portion of conventional global strike forc-
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es that are segmented from similar lower half forces
to receive enhanced cyber survivability measures.135
Akin to the original Kahn model, attacks will intensify to counterforce targets and then broaden to civilian infrastructure toward a worst case of being totally
indiscriminate. Conflicts at these degrees of escalation
are likely to operate outside of accepted international
norms, or perhaps even in ways where no norms exist.
Weapon delivery precision, effect predictability, and
collateral damage avoidance become more difficult
due to the increased intensity of operations as well
as less important when compared to the increasing
national stakes.
The strategic war threshold between the lower and
upper escalation areas is no longer limited to the use
of nuclear weapons, and, in fact, it is highly unlikely
that any limited nuclear exchange would occur. Rather, this becomes the region where limited offensive cyber or conventional global strike may begin against vital targets found in the upper half. Such strikes could
have effects beyond the accepted proportionality and
perfidy of those in the limited conflict, whether by design or by accident. Thus, it is crucial for forces to be
cautious in the use of such weapons to minimize unintended consequences that may cross into the upper
half of the ladder.
Dynamics of Conflict.
In the lower half, Kahn notes there are three main
ways to escalate a limited conflict: increase its intensity; widen the area; or compound the escalation by
attacking other actors. He offers an analogy for this
area’s dynamics as being similar to those of a labor
strike. In each case, it is assumed that both sides have
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serious issues to resolve, sometimes through threats
of harm, but there is no real desire to do permanent or
excessive damage. As with a labor strike, the conflict
may require considerable give-and-take bargaining to
ensure stability between the parties.136
In contrast, conflict in the upper half of the ladder
can be likened to a game of “chicken,” a contest of
brinksmanship that creates a winner when the loser
loses their nerve (such as driving two cars toward
each other to see who will swerve to avoid a collision).
Unfortunately, in the worst case, both parties are destroyed (no one swerves), and in the best case, the
loser is humiliated, leaving little chance for compromise or face saving necessary for long-term stability.137
Thus, a strategy of deterrence should include widely
understood precedents and thresholds to be reliable
for stability and controlled escalation that can prevent
a game of chicken being played with nuclear weapons.
Roles of Active Cyber Defense.
As previously noted, the term ACD has no universal definition, but it is generally considered to include proactive measures that may extend beyond the
particular network being defended. The roles of ACD
and their relation to the dynamics of conflict and escalation can be illustrated as the ladder turned on its
side as in Figure 10. In the lower half of conflict, the
reality that there will always be minor cyber probing
and attacks has been accepted and planning guidance
now addresses resiliency for operating in a degraded
network environment. For the U.S. military, the ACD
is a “synchronized, real-time capability to discover,
detect, analyze, and mitigate threats and vulnerabilities” which includes proactive operations “at network
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speed by using sensors, software, and intelligence to
detect and stop malicious activity before it can affect
DoD networks and systems.”138

Figure 10. Relation of ACD to the
Dynamics of Conflict and Escalation.
Ideally, ACD applications are limited to achieve
the minimal effects necessary to defend the military
network. This reflects several forms of national motivation; primarily contractual—working toward a
reasonable cost/benefit balance—as well as agonistic—functioning along the lines of evolving rules of
Internet governance. Motivations may also reflect
familial norms, such as trying to preserve a free and
open Internet. Stylistic motivations and actions may
be a source of friction in limited conflict since they are
45

often tied to national character and culture, which can
vary greatly for cyberspace issues among the United
States, Russia, China, North Korea, and others. Motivations of explicit coercion are not expected unless one
is willing to accept possible escalatory consequences.
In military terms, any ACD actions that extend
beyond blocking network access points would strive
to be precise, proportional, and limited in scope. The
focus would be to enhance joint operations of general purpose forces at the tactical and operation levels—mainly intelligence gathering and defenses that
operate under decentralized authorities.139 If kinetic
attacks reach the level of armed conflict, then supporting cyber operations should also follow the tenets of
the Law of Armed Conflict (e.g., necessity, distinction,
proportionality).140 As such confrontations occur in the
future, systems bargaining among nations may lead
to the development of formal and informal rules of
engagement that add stability and reduce the chance
for unintentional escalation. Certainly, nonstate actors
can and do operate in cyberspace asymmetrically and
outside of international norms, but that is beyond the
scope of this discussion.
In the upper half of Figure 10, the goal is to prevent
conflict from escalating to a game of chicken with nuclear arms. Of course, a strategy of deterrence requires
the capabilities and resolve to conduct extreme violence in order to influence a potential adversary not to
pursue such a course of action. If such forces are used,
the concern for precision would focus on effectiveness
with decreased concern for limiting collateral damage.
Similarly, the criteria for distinction of purely military
targets, especially in the cyber realm, may be relaxed
in order to protect critical deterrent forces.
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A prudent force structure in this case is to have
separate ACD capabilities that are optimized to ensure the proper function of the deterrent forces—conventional strike, cyber offense, and nuclear strike.
This approach also makes sense from a budget and
resource perspective since the expense in adding additional protection, survival, and resilience measures
would be confined to the critical portion of strategic
ACD. Operations at this level would require “fires”
authority that “should reside at the highest levels of
government” with no decentralization.141 This is consistent with traditional nuclear operations concept
of execution direction being provided by a limited
number of national command authorities. The national motivation leans heavily toward coercion after
diplomatic efforts become increasingly strained and
ineffective.142
Clearly, the threshold area is a critical transition
from regionally limited conflict that largely conforms
to international standards to a much riskier engagement that can escalate to existential stakes. In this
area, kinetic activity has reached the levels of armed
attack or perhaps armed conflict, and belligerent cyber activity has gone from minor probing and isolated intrusions to more complex and pervasive attacks.
Criteria discussed in the Tallinn Manual can help assess its international legal implications,143 but if the
state-sponsored attacks begin against such targets as
banks and power grids, the intensity and stakes move
toward the upper half. While military ACD will still be
operating at the tactical and operational levels, there
needs to be additional measures of ACD extending to
help protect against attacks on civilian and infrastructure targets. Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs General Martin Dempsey recently noted about such cyber
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aggression: “It’s not just an inconvenience, if we lost
critical infrastructure on the east coast for a period of
time, people’s lives would be lost.” The ACD required
to protect cyber targets outside of military networks
would be broader in scope and require interagency
consultation, cooperation, and resources.144 Potential
ACD actions by citizens and private industry touch
on many unresolved controversies that merit further
discussion.
Table 2 summarizes the types of forces expected at
each area of the simplified model; ACD is considered
as a subset of cyber forces. Allied and coalition military forces would also be present at each level and the
added complexity of their operations merits more detailed analysis beyond this monograph. Circumstances will dictate where activity begins along the escalation ladder; it need not begin at the lowest point. Any
ensuing escalation need not be sequential or linear in
its progression. Kahn offered several criteria to consider for measuring the degree of escalation possible
in any particular time which in turn can indicate the
scope of ACD required.145 First, one must examine the
current scale, scope, and intensity of violence of the
conflict as well as the resolve (or recklessness) demonstrated. Next, one should assess if any actual damage
has been done. What is the apparent closeness to war
moving to the upper half of the ladder? Evaluating the
stability of the conflict is important to determine the
likelihood of eruptions or spikes in attacks that could
fuel escalation. This would include evaluating what
provocation has occurred and what precedents have
been broken as well as what threats has been intended
or perceived.
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Type of Military Forces
Escalation Ladder

Conventional

Cyber

Nuclear

Area

Forces

Forces

Forces

- Segmented from general
forces

- ACD focused on
protecting deterrence

Upper Half

- Precise Effects

(Existential Conflict)

- Collateral damage more
acceptable

- Triggers and activity
authorized by highest
national command
- Cyber offense used

- ACD help support
defense of national
infrastructure

- Support of other agencies
and departments

(Theater / Regional
Conflicts)

- Weapons of last
resort authorized
by highest national
command

- Not used
- Readiness increased

- ACD at network
bounds

- General purpose forces
in all domains
Lower Half

- Aircraft & missile
delivery

- Whole-of-government operations

- Continued theater level
conflict
Strategic Warfare
Threshold

- Full alert for use

- Limited ACD beyond
network

- Precise delivery and effects
- Minimize collateral damage

- Not used
- Readiness maintained

- Military command
(delegated authority)

Table 2. Use of Military Forces in
Simplified Escalation Ladder Areas.
Active Cyber Defense and Deterrence.
Since an expanded deterrent capability with survivability enhanced by ACD measures plays an essential
role in controlling conflict escalation, there is merit in
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a more detailed review of an implementation concept
possible for U.S. forces. Figure 11 depicts a conceptual design for ACD interfaces supporting deterrence
operations in the upper half of the escalation ladder.
The ACD activities would operate in two modes: an
automatic mode with triggers based on a priori criteria established and updated by command authorities
and a manual mode that requires command authority direction for execution. Situational awareness is
maintained through information provided by strategic intelligence sources as well as tactical and operational indications and warnings. Results from ACD
actions—cyber battle damage assessment—are provided as feedback. Decisionmaking by national command authorities can be supported by artificial intelligence systems that can develop and assess courses of
action, perhaps leveraging advanced “mindreading”
designs that can rapidly perform modeling, simulation, and prediction reflecting fifth-order beliefs.146

Figure 11. Details of ACD in Deterrence
Operations.
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The ACD system would provide continuous automated protection for the deterrence strike forces
shown as well as the command and control systems of
the command authorities. The first line of kinetic deterrent forces would be conventional global strike forces that are always segmented from general purpose
forces—thus no dual purpose missions are allowed
for these forces in limited conflict. These would be of
sufficient quantity for anticipated threats, perhaps as
few as 20 long-range aircraft plus long-range missiles.
The ultimate deterrent remains nuclear forces, which
would continue to be a mix of weapons delivered by
aircraft and land- and sea-based ballistic missiles in
numbers that reflect continuing arms reduction.147
The specific roles of offensive cyber strike forces
are currently ambiguous and activities may overlap
between ACD that assertively negates cyber attacks
against deterrence forces and offensive cyber attacks
for counterforce operations. The 2011 U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace includes a declaratory statement that supports its inherent right to self-defense
and deterrence: “When warranted, the United States
will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we would
to any other threat to our country.” It goes on to state
that such response may “use all necessary means—
diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—as
appropriate and consistent with international law.”148
Healey and Wilson examined cyber offensive actions
and their approximate physical world equivalent and
how existing executive and legislative provisions may
apply to them.149 A recent study by The Defence Academy of the UK cautions that “online weapons may be
unreliable or uncertain in their effects” and that such
weapons “coupled with an explicit policy of conventional military kinetic retaliation risks rapid escalation
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of real-world war.”150 Other respected theorists such
as Colin Gray are more conservative in their assessments, offering that “cyber offense usually is likely to
achieve some success,” but that “the harm we suffer
is most unlikely to be close to lethally damaging;”
concluding that “it is clear enough today that the sky
is not falling because of the cyber peril.”151 Clearly,
the topic of integrating cyber offensive into strategic
operations requires further extensive study.
Deterrence Effectiveness.
Perhaps some Cold War lessons learned can serve
as a “litmus test” for an updated deterrence strategy
incorporating ACD and cyber offence. Richard Kugler
posits that U.S. nuclear deterrence worked because it
was credible; it was conducted in the context of political dynamics; it denied the Soviet Union any favorable prospects from aggression; it favored development of flexible options; and it minimized the risk
of unwanted escalation.152 Incorporating ACD into
deterrence improves credibility by enhancing deterrence force capabilities and survival. Also, having a
declaratory statement from the country’s executive in
an official public document demonstrates resolve and
legality. As Eric Jensen noted, “while this statement
was controversial when made, there is no doubt of its
legality.”153 The updated escalation ladder adds perspective on how to view ACD and other cyber support of operations not in isolation, but in the context
of all elements of national power. Admittedly, this
section has viewed these issues from the perspective
of the United States, which implicitly includes mutual
military commitments with allies; further discussion
should examine this more explicitly. Having a three-
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pronged deterrence force protected by ACD strives to
influence an adversary’s decisionmaking by not only
denying benefits, but also by imposing costs and inducing restraint. Implementing such a cross-domain
framework “would contribute to more effective deterrence and crisis management.”154 By design, this crossdomain force provides national command authorities
with flexible options that are beyond nuclear-only in
case of extreme escalation.155 In theory, while having
more options below the nuclear level may reduce the
chance of reaching the ultimate limit of war, there is
no guarantee that it would minimize the risk of unwanted escalation below that threshold.
RECOMMENDATIONS
This monograph examines the past and present
of joint and Army cyberspace military operations as
well as how these operations may fit into the complex
and dynamic sphere of international deterrence and
escalation. To facilitate the best evolutionary path for
future activities it recommends the following actions
be considered.
Current Military Cyberspace Priorities.
The five command priorities set forth by General
Alexander and carried forward by Admiral Rogers
seem appropriate for the current evolution of USCYBERCOM and progress on them continues at a
steady pace. However, some of the successes in operationalizing cyberspace are hidden behind questionable classification decisions. Specifically, it is difficult
to comprehend why the inaugural version of JP 3-12
was issued as a secret document instead of an unclas-
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sified document with a classified annex. This unnecessary occlusion of basic doctrinal tenets (such as those
in FM 3-38) greatly hampers both U.S. and allied planners and military educators. This is particularly ironic
when one considers that the former manifestation of
JP 3-12 was as Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, a
document that was somehow kept unclassified. As
cyberspace doctrinal information is incorporated in
updates of capstone documents (e.g., JPs 3-0 and 5-0
[Joint Operation Planning]), the developers should consider adding a concise cyberspace annex that serves
as a primer for cyberspace domain considerations.
Military and national cyberspace activities writ large
would benefit greatly if dedicated cyberspace theory
development was promulgated that includes exploration beyond the domain definition of cyberspace.
All of these recommendations could be supported
by efforts at the Army’s fledgling Cyber Center of
Excellence.
Authorities.
Determining the appropriate authorities involved
with decisionmaking and cyberspace operations, such
as ACD actions, through the escalation ladder will continue to be a challenging and evolving issue. Military
forces are developing doctrine and force structures
to incorporate existing cyber related forces as well as
newly defined positions. Ideally, these are tested, refined, and validated in exercise situations before full
employment. However, as conflict escalates, so does
the need to coordinate military operations with other
powers of government as well as with allies and international governance bodies. Potential ACD actions
by citizens and private industry and their impact on
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the conflict environment also have responsibility and
legitimacy issues that cannot be ignored. At the highstakes end of operations, one of the greatest challenges is determining ways of applying and updating the
a priori authorities for ACD protecting deterrence forces. Jensen offers a detailed and nuanced assessment of
legal issues related to cyber deterrence.156
Strategic Communication.
As work progresses toward better definition of cyberspace force roles based on context and dynamics
of escalation framework, this must include strategic
communication. These are planned and coordinated
activities to provide the actions, images, and words
necessary to help make the modified deterrence effective in the ways intended. Manzo notes that:
cultural differences, contrasting strategic objectives,
differing strengths and vulnerabilities can cause decisionmakers in the United States and other countries to
reach different conclusions about proportionality and
escalation.157

Efforts to overcome such differences could leverage studies like Melissa Hathaway’s recent development of a Cyber Readiness Index, which examines
the maturity and commitment for cybersecurity by
35 countries, including those that had formally established national strategies and competent authorities,
mostly in nonmilitary areas.158 Also, the publication
of an unclassified version of JP 3-12 would contribute
to the international understanding and commitment
of U.S. cyberspace forces. All of these activities would
support strategic engagement—the socio-political
support for cyberspace operations—as the second dimension of full spectrum operations.159
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Multi-Role Modeling.
Creating a realistic model for cyberspace force
roles in escalation and deterrence requires a holistic
consideration of environmental influences. As Ronald
Deibert notes, “Securing cyberspace requires reinforcement of restraint on power, including checks and
balances on governments, law enforcement and intelligence agencies.”160 The first dimension of full spectrum operations involves the psychological contest of
wills.161 The Kahn ladder was never envisioned for application beyond modeling interactions between two
nations. To portray our multipolar world more accurately, models need to not only consider interactions
between multiple nations, but also that the “policies
to deter one type of adversary may differ from those
needed to deter another adversary, with varying degrees of soft and hard rhetoric or of positive incentives
and punishing responses.”162 The model should also
include the dynamic of groups of nations, especially
those in formal alliances such as the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO). Finally, the activity of
individuals and nonstate actors groups—some operating within accepted international norms, some
not—can present asymmetric challenges and potential threats to the dealings amongst nations and thus
should be included in the multi-role models.
Other Paradigms and Factors.
In addition to considering Cold War models such
as the Kahn ladder, Sean Lawson also examined other
metaphors as frameworks for analyzing cyberspace activities related to strategic deterrence. He posits there
are similarities between insurgency or biological war-
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fare and cyber crime and espionage.163 Paradigms are
needed to model cyber activity outside of designated
military networks; these could help better define the
threshold separating ACD that negates cyber attacks
against deterrence forces from offensive cyber attacks
for counterforce operations. Finally, the longer-term
dynamics of de-escalation and counter-proliferation
measures, such as potential arms control in cyberspace, introduce valuable methods for achieving and
maintaining a more stable international environment
in all domains. 164
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Military cyberspace operations have been ongoing since before the advent of the Internet. Such operations have evolved significantly over the past 2
decades and are just now emerging into the realm of
military operations in the traditional domains of land,
sea, and air. To facilitate the operationalization of this
new domain, education of the tenets of cyberspace
must occur at the tactical, operational, and strategic
levels of leadership. More importantly, the deliberate
pursuit of understanding the full scope of cyberspace
beyond that of a mere domain is essential for providing a theoretical foundation for current and future operations. Also in this regard, the development of such
fundamental theory should look forward to embrace
potentially radical manifestations of cyberspace in the
future as well as looking back at its history.
The persistent increase of cyberspace activities in
global events continues to make international dynamics more complex. The scope of context for such matters
needs to consider not just other military efforts or even
other instruments of national power, but how they are
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presented in an escalation framework and where they
may be going. A modified Kahn escalation ladder is
a useful metaphor to explore how cyberspace activities may integrate with traditional military operations
across the spectrum of international conflict as well as
how such defenses influence national responses related to deterrence and escalation. Expanding deterrence
forces to include conventional strike and cyber offense
can add capability and credibility as well as flexibility
to course-of-action development available for national command authorities. Cyberspace operations such
as automated cyber defense can support and enhance
deterrence operations and limited conflict as well as
help control escalation and reduce risk.
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APPENDIX
The following diagram is taken from Chapter IV
of JP 3-12(R), Cyberspace Operations, that was declassified and posted for public access on October 21, 2014.
It depicts typical military cyberspace command and
control structures for steady-state and contingency
operations. Note that the organization listed as “USSRATCOM” in the upper left corner of the figure is a
typographic error for “USSTRATCOM.”

Figure A-1. Cyberspace Command and Control
Organizational Construct.
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